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Intimidation and the Internet
William Funk*
"Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt
me.

I.

Introduction

In 2002, in the case of Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists,1 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, upheld the district
court's decision that the American Coalition of Life Activists, and
several individuals associated with it, had violated the Freedom of
Access to Clinics Entrances Act (FACE) 2 by maintaining a website
entitled the Nuremberg Files.3 In upholding the district court's decision,
the circuit court also upheld the damages awarded against the defendants,
as well as the injunction against the defendants' maintenance of the
Nuremberg Files website.4 A major issue in the case was whether it was
a violation of the First Amendment to restrain the defendants from
maintaining this website.5 Of the eleven judges on the panel, six found
that the website was not protected speech under the First Amendment,
while five found that it was.6 Commentary on the decision in both the
press and the academy was generally negative, viewing the decision as a
setback for First Amendment values.'
This article argues that while the Nuremberg Files site was not
protected by the First Amendment, the reasons given by the judges in the
majority on the Ninth Circuit were not the correct reasons for that
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School; Fulbright Senior Scholar,
University of Heidelberg (2004-05).
1. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
2. Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248.
3. PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1088.
4. Id. at 1088.
5. Id. at 1070-71.
6. Id. at 1059.
7. See, e.g., The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/2002_05-12_volokharchive.html; Dahlia Lithwick, Poster Children, http://www.slate.com/id/2066130/.
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conclusion. Rather, this article suggests that current First Amendment
doctrine does not directly address the problem raised by the Nuremberg
Files site: speech that is neither a direct threat nor an incitement, but
nevertheless-because of its particular character, including its
publication on the Intemet-is intended to and does have the immediate
effect of intimidating persons from engaging in lawful, even
constitutionally protected, behavior.
In reaching this conclusion, this article will try to make three points.
First, fear is a social evil that the state may protect against, an evil
distinct from the actual danger of an event occurring. Second, the
Internet is special; it is not "like" any other traditional media. Third,
First Amendment analysis should not be limited to categorizing
particular activities in certain predetermined boxes, such as true threats,
incitement, defamation, fighting words, etc.; rather, it should be
governed more by principles that take account of the balancing implicit
in current First Amendment doctrine and categories.
II.

The Nuremberg Files

The Nuremberg Files was a website that contained a list of names of
doctors who performed abortions, persons who owned or worked in
abortion clinics, judges who had issued decisions defending abortion
rights, politicians who had spoken or voted in favor of abortion rights,
policemen who had protected abortion clinics, and "miscellaneous
spouses and blood flunkies." 8 Some names on these lists were crossed
out, while others were in light grey rather than black. A legend on the
website explained that the persons whose names were listed in black
were working, while those listed in grey were wounded, and those whose
names were struck out were fatalities. 9 Some of the names were linked
to "wanted" posters that included the persons' work and home addresses,
photographs, telephone numbers, spouses' names, and children's names
and school addresses.' 0 Persons visiting the site were invited to write
letters to the named persons stating the following:
We noticed that you [are] working at [name of abortion facility]. As
a public service, we publish a free Web Page on the INTERNET for
each killer who works at [that abortion facility].
Please send us any data or maybe a favorite picture that you would
8. See www.xs4all.nl/-oracle/nuremberg/aborts.html.
The original Nuremberg
Files site was closed as result of the court injunction, but this overseas site has recreated
it as an historical artifact. It is not updated as was the original.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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like for us to put on your page. We want to make sure that we get
everything exactly right since the INTERNET goes over the entire
world. Again, I want to emphasize that there is no cost to you for this
public service.
Persons visiting the website were also requested to provide names of
other abortion providers:
send us their names, ETC. (Notice the emphasis on the et cetera) and
then send them a letter similar to the one above telling them that
they're being published in the Nuremberg Files.
If you'd like, feel free to tell them your letter is from the Nuremberg
Files Association, because it will be. You become a lifetime
member
12
of the Association as soon as you send your first letter.
The site also contained graphic depictions of aborted fetuses. The
alleged purpose of the site was to collect evidence for use in a some day,
hoped for trial of the named persons for crimes against humanity because
of their involvement in providing or supporting abortions: hence the
site's title, the Nuremberg Files.
The site by its terms did not threaten the named persons, nor did it
call upon others to do physical harm to the named persons. Nevertheless,
the site could easily be construed as carrying the message that the named
persons might well be targeted for violence by anti-abortion activists
because of the characterization of the named persons as killers or
murderers, the highlighted names of doctors and others who had been
murdered or wounded by anti-abortion activists, the wanted posters with
personally identifying information, and the fact of real violence being
perpetrated against abortion providers
In fact, there was evidence that several of the named providers were
terrified by their listing, especially because the Federal Bureau of
Investigation informed them that their listing was likely to make them
targets for violence and recommended that they wear bullet proof vests
in public. 13 There was also some evidence that the persons responsible
14
for the site viewed this terrorization as a positive effect of the site.
III. FACE and the Threat of Force
The Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act (FACE) makes it a
crime if any person, "by force or threat of force or by physical

11.

Id.

12.
13.
14.

Id.
PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1066.
Id. at 1065.
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obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or
attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that
person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other
person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive
health services." 15 In addition, FACE creates a civil cause of action for
any person aggrieved by the prohibited conduct, with remedies including
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. 16
In the Planned Parenthood case, the plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants had, by "threat of force," intimidated several doctors who
performed abortions.' 7 According to the United States Supreme Court, ia8
"true threat" is not protected speech under the First Amendment.
Therefore, courts have interpreted the threat of force language in FACE
to require a "true threat" under First Amendment doctrine.' 9 The true
threat doctrine is derived from two cases: Watts v. United States20 and
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,21 neither of which actually found a
true threat to exist. Watts, the earlier case, involved an 18-year-old war
protester who, during a public rally against the war in Vietnam, stated to
a group assembled at the Washington Monument:
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already
received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for
my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. [the
President] 22
The war protester was prosecuted under the federal statute making it a
crime to "knowingly and willfully... make any threat to take the life or
to inflict bodily harm upon the President., 23 The Court held that this was
not a true threat in the context in which it was made but merely "a kind
of very crude
offensive method of stating a political opposition to the
24
President.
NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo. was a much more difficult case.
The local chapter of the NAACP had organized a boycott of stores in
Port Gibson, Mississippi, when the city government refused to comply
with nineteen demands made by the NAACP to eliminate segregation in
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248.
18 U.S.C. § 248(c).
PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1062.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1072-75.
394 U.S. 705 (1969).
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
18U.S.C. § 871.
Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
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the city. 25 Based upon successful boycotts of white-owned businesses in
other southern cities, the NAACP believed that, by putting economic
pressure on the white-owned businesses, these businesses would then
integrate their stores and also put pressure on the city government to
integrate city services, especially the police department.2 6 The boycott
began in 1966 and continued until the lawsuit was filed in 1969.27 The
lawsuit was brought by several white-owned businesses seeking an
injunction against the boycott and damages resulting from lost business
due to the boycott.2 8 The trial did not begin until 1973, and in 1976 the
court rendered its decision, issuing an injunction and assessing damages
jointly and severally against 130 individuals and the national
organization
of the NAACP in the amount of $1.25 million plus
29
interest.
The case raised a number of First Amendment issues. One issue
was whether a secondary boycott to induce government action is
protected by the First Amendment. 30 Both the Mississippi and United
States Supreme Courts held that such a boycott is protected.3' Another
issue raised by the case was whether the organizers of the boycott could
threaten vilification and social ostracism against blacks who did not
observe the boycott and traded with the white-owned businesses.32 The
Supreme Court held that such "threats" were constitutionally protected.3 3
A third issue raised by the case was whether certain statements
suggesting threats of violence against blacks, when combined with a
couple of acts of violence against blacks who were not honoring the
boycott, could have the effect of depriving the entire boycott of First
Amendment protection.34
In addressing this third issue, the Court minimized the number and
seriousness of the statements suggesting violence. Charles Evers, the
Field Secretary for the NAACP and the organizer of the boycott, was
quoted as including in his speech that began the boycott the statement
that "uncle toms" who broke the boycott "would have their necks
broken,,35 and, in a later speech again rallying the listeners to maintain
the boycott, he said that the sheriff could not sleep with the violators at
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

ClaiborneHardware, 458 U.S. at 889.
Id. at 888-90.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 891-93.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 887.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 900 n.28.
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night in order to protect them. 36 These statements, the Court said:
"implicitly conveyed a sterner message. In the passionate atmosphere in
which the speeches were delivered, they might have been understood as
inviting an unlawful form of discipline or, at least, as intending to create
a fear of violence
whether or not improper discipline was specifically
37
intended."
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that this "emotionally charged
39
rhetoric" 38 did not satisfy the requirements of Brandenburg v. Ohio,
and thus did not qualify as unprotected speech.40 Rather, these isolated
statements occurred in the context of "lengthy addresses",4I that generally
were directed at entirely legitimate goals and aspirations.42 The Court
noted:
Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely
channeled [sic] in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to
stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for
unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do43 not
incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech.
Here there was no evidence that these statements in fact precipitated
violence. It was not denied that there were a few acts of violence but
there was no evidence that Evers or the NAACP was connected with
them. 44 Thus, the question was whether those few acts of violence,
which were certainly not protected by the First Amendment, "colored the
entire collective effort., 45 The Court concluded:
A massive and prolonged effort to change the social, political, and
economic structure of a local environment cannot be characterized as
a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral
consequences of relatively few violent acts. Such a characterization
must be supported by findings that adequately disclose the
evidentiary basis for concluding that specific parties agreed to use
unlawful means, that carefully identify the impact of such unlawful
conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding the
imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected activity. The
36. Id. at 927.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 928.
39. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that speech would qualify as unprotected
incitement only when the speaker intends to incite people to imminent violence, and the
speech is likely to have this effect).
40. ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 928.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 929.
45. Id. at 933.
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burden of demonstratingthatfear ratherthan
46 protected conduct was
the dominantforce in the movement is heavy.
IV.

The PlannedParenthoodOpinions
The majority in Planned Parenthood believed that Claiborne

Hardware was distinguishable because it "did not arise under a threats
statute. 47 In other words, the issue in Claiborne Hardware was not
whether Evers' statements were unprotected "true threats," but whether
they were unprotected incitements. The only statements the Court had
classified as "threats" in Claiborne Hardware were the threats of
vilification and social ostracism. Because the Supreme Court has not
defined what constitutes a "true threat," as opposed to what is not, the
Ninth Circuit has developed the following test for determining whether a
true threat exists: "a reasonable person would foresee the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the
statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault. ' 48 Stated
more simply, "a threat is 'an expression of an intention to inflict evil,
injury, or damage on another. ' '49
The majority analyzed the Nuremberg Files according to this test.
First, the majority decided that the Nuremberg Files must be viewed
contextually and that a true threat could be delivered by indirection-that
is, a true threat does not require explicitly threatening language.5 °
Second, the majority found that a true threat can exist whether or not the
person making the statement has the ability, or even the intent, to carry
out the threat. 5 1 Applying these principles, the majority reviewed the
record "independently" in order to determine whether the Nuremberg
Files constituted a true threat.52 The majority concluded that even
though the general language concerning the hope for a trial that would
bring abortion providers to justice was protected under the First
Amendment, the listing of particular providers' names, especially when
viewed in the context of the violent attacks taking place against some of
46. Id. at 933-34 (emphasis supplied).
47. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
48. Id. at 1074 (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th
Cir. 1990)).
49. Id. at 1075 (quoting United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989)).
50. Id. at 1078.
51. Id. at 1075. The ACLU of Oregon argued that there must also be evidence,
albeit perhaps circumstantial or inferential, "that the speaker actually intended to induce
fear, intimidation, or terror." Id. (emphasis in original). The majority rejected this in the
context of a FACE claim because the statute itself requires an "intent to intimidate." Id.
at 1077.
52. Id. at 1063.
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the listed providers, took the Nuremberg Files outside of purely political
protected expression. 3 The majority stated:
[The plaintiffs'] fear did not simply happen; [the defendants]
intended to intimidate them from doing what they do.... [The
defendants] may have been staking out a position for debate when it
merely advocated violence....
Likewise, when it created the
Nuremberg Files in the abstract, because the First Amendment does
not preclude calling people demeaning or inflammatory names, or
threatening social ostracism or vilification to advocate a political
position.
But,.., by putting [the plaintiffs' names] in an
abortionists' File that scores fatalities, [the defendants54 were] not
staking out a position of debate but of threatened demise.
The court's decision evoked three dissenting opinions. Judge
Reinhardt authored a dissent to the effect that publicly delivered speech,
as opposed to privately delivered threats, was entitled to heightened
scrutiny.55 The majority rejected this argument on the grounds that there
56
was no precedent for it and substantial precedent against it.
Judge Berzon authored a dissent in which Judges Kozinski,
Kleinfeldt, and Reinhardt joined, and Part III of which Judge
O'Scannlain joined. 7 Part I of Judge Berzon's dissent argued that this
case was analogous to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:58
Like "true threats," false, defamatory speech can severely disrupt
peoples' lives, both by affecting them emotionally (as does
apprehension of danger) and by impairing their social ties, their
professional activities, and their ability to earn a living (as does the
perceived need to protect oneself from physical harm).
The Supreme Court since the 1960s has developed a set of discrete
principles designed not to provide false speech with constitutional
protection, but to erect, on an ascending scale depending upon the
perceived value of the particular kind of speech to the common
dialogue that the First Amendment is designed to foster, doctrinal
protections within defamation law that minimizes self-censorship of
truthful speech. 59
Accordingly, Judge Berzon suggested that there should not be a unitary
53. Id. at 1086.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1089 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Judges Kozinski, Kleinfeld, and Berzon
joined Judge Reinhardt's dissent.
56. Id.at1076n.11.
57. Id. at 1101 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1103 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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true threats standard, but rather standards that vary "depending upon the
nature of the speech in question and the role of speech of that nature in
the scheme of the First Amendment., 60 In the case of the Nuremberg
Files, the public nature of the speech, as opposed to a privately
communicated threat, the lack of any explicit threatening language and
the reliance on context outside the control or direction of the defendants
to provide the perception of a physical threat, and the core political issue
involved in the case all militated in favor of providing greater protection
to the speech, even
if the result was to place the plaintiffs in fear of
61
violence.
physical
Finally, Judge Kozinski wrote a dissent joined by Judges Reinhardt,
Berzon, O'Scannlain, and Kleinfeld. 62 The essence of Judge Kozinski's
dissent was that an integral component of a "true threat" is that the
person making the threat must indicate that he will take an active role in
the threatened violence: 'The difference between a true threat and
protected expression is this: A true threat warns of violence or other
Here, neither the language of the
harm that the speaker controls. ,,63netr
Nuremberg Files nor even the context suggested such control by the
speakers. Perhaps most telling was the fact that the plaintiffs themselves
explained "that the fear that they felt came, not from defendants, but
from being singled out for attention by abortion protesters across the
country." 64 Consequently, in Judge Kozinski's view, the Nuremberg
Files did not fall into one of the "narrow categories of unprotected
speech recognized by the Supreme Court." 65 Instead, Judge Kozinski
saw the case as indistinguishable from Claiborne Hardware. He quoted
from the Court's opinion in Claiborne Hardware that some of the
speeches made by Charles Evers "might have been understood as...
intending to create a fear of violence....,,66 Judge Kozinski noted,
however, that Evers' speeches were found to be protected speech.67
Thus, he concluded, the Nuremberg Files likewise should be considered
protected speech.

60. Id. at 1104 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
61. Id. In Parts II and III of this dissent, Judge Berzon took issue with evidentiary
rulings made by the district court and upheld by the majority. See id. at 1111-20 (Berzon,
J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1089 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1094 (quoting NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927
(1982)) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1094 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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Analysis

We start with some acknowledged facts. The defendants in Planned
Parenthooddesired to intimidate not only the named plaintiffs, but also
other named abortion providers, into ceasing to provide a lawful, even a
constitutionally protected, service. Moreover, the defendants desired to
intimidate the plaintiffs not through ostracism or vilification, but through
instilling a fear of danger to the lives and physical security of them, their
spouses, and their children. This intimidation was carried out by
targeting these identified individuals in a way that could facilitate the
ability of radical anti-abortionists to take violent actions against them and
thereby made such actions more likely. The fact that some of the
abortion providers that were identified had already been murdered or
injured increased the credibility that other persons so identified were in
real risk of severe danger.
And we start with some acknowledged law. Under existing
doctrine, the Nuremberg Files could not be considered unprotected
"incitement" within the definition of Brandenburg. The causal
immediacy of the called for violence simply did not exist. Moreover, as
Judge Kozinski noted, there was no allegation of a criminal conspiracy,
and the Nuremberg Files did not constitute "fighting words" within the
understanding of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.68 Obviously, the
question whether the Files constituted a "true threat" is debatable in light
of the court's split on the subject, but Judge Kozinski's argument-that
in order for something to be a threat the speaker must be suggesting
some control over the action threatened-was left unanswered by the
majority. 69 The majority seemed almost intentionally to misconstrue
Judge Kozinski's point that a threat is an expression by a person to do
harm, or at least to be involved with those who would do the harm, as
opposed to a statement that suggests that someone else will do the harm.
The majority stressed that the "true threat" doctrine does not require the
speaker actually to intend to do the harm. While the majority's recitation
of the doctrine is accurate, and not contested by Judge Kozinski, the
meaning of the doctrine is that, while the speaker may not actually intend
to do the harm, the speaker leads the listener to believe that the speaker
will do the harm. In other words, the threat may be false, one that will
not be carried out. Nevertheless, it can still be a "true threat" in that it

68. Id. at 1092 (citing 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942)) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
69. The dissents occasionally contrast threats with warnings, stating that only the
former are unprotected, even though both may cause fear in the listener. Here, however,
the defendants were not warning the plaintiffs of potential violence; rather, it was the FBI
who warned the defendants that they should consider wearing bulletproof vests.
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causes real fear in the person threatened. The doctrine that the speaker
need not actually intend to do the harm simply does not address the
situation where the speaker does not even lead the listener to believe that
the speaker intends to do harm-the situation present in the Nuremberg
Files, where there was no suggestion (or understanding by readers) that
the authors of the site themselves or anyone subject to their control
intended to do physical violence to the persons named on the site. "True
threat" doctrine simply does not address this type of speech. This is
perhaps confirmed by the fact that no "true threat" cases have been
brought, much less decided against the speaker, when the speaker did not
indicate that he or someone under his control or authority would do the
harm. Because the authors of the Nuremberg Files did not create any
impression that they or anyone subject to their control or direction would
commit any violence, the Nuremberg Files do not appear to be a "true
threat" within the meaning of existing doctrine.7 °
While this conclusion in effect ended the analysis for the dissenting
judges, the suggestion that the Nuremberg Files do not fit within the
"narrow categories of unprotected speech recognized by the Supreme
Court" should have invited the question whether a new category or
analysis is called for.
A.

Fearas a Social Evil

The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed fear as a social
evil that the state may take action to prevent. Incitement of violence may
cause fear, but the Brandenburgtest focuses on the violent activity that
will take place, not on the fear induced by the speech. Under
Brandenburg, the state may prevent the violence, and if the speech is
closely connected to causing imminent violence (and causing the
violence is the intent of the speaker), then the speech is not protected.
Similarly, under the modem conception of "fighting words," these words
are not protected precisely because they effectively cause violence. In
both cases, the focus of the analysis is on the action that the words
induce, because it is viewed as the social evil the state is allowed to
prevent.
Cohen v. California,71 on the other hand, teaches that speech does
70. Whether this means it is not a "threat" within the meaning of FACE is another
question. Clearly, the speech subject to sanction under FACE must be unprotected by the
First Amendment, but the lack of protection need not arise under the true threat doctrine.
That is, what is a threat for purposes of the statute need not necessarily be a true threat
under First Amendment doctrine. Determining whether the Nuremberg Files were indeed
subject to FACE, as opposed to unprotected under the First Amendment, is not the
subject of this article.
71. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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not lose its First Amendment protection because it causes offense to
public sensibilities. In Cohen, the focus is on the direct effect the speech
produces in persons, but the negative effect of causing offense to public
sensibilities was not sufficient to outweigh the social value of the speech.
Moreover, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,72 even the intentional
infliction of emotional distress did not overcome First Amendment
values when it involved public debate involving a public figure. These
cases might suggest that the value of public speech on public issues
always trumps the individual sensibilities of adults.
Nevertheless, in Claiborne Hardware, the Court's statement"[t]he burden of demonstrating that fear rather than protected conduct
was the dominant force in the movement [was] heavy" 73-may be read to
suggest that, if the intent of speech was to induce fear, otherwise
protected speech would lose its protection. Fear has much in common
with emotional distress and something in common with personal offense.
Fear, emotional distress, and personal offense all can be of greater or
lesser degree, but great fear and emotional distress differ from great
offense (unless the great offense itself results in great fear or emotional
distress), because the former are psychologically debilitating and can
even induce physical ailments. Fear, like emotional distress and personal
offense, has a subjective element, so that persons may feel fear even in
the absence of a real risk.74
Nonetheless, fear that is actually
experienced, whether or not it is reasonably based, can have effects that
are sufficiently negative to justify the state undertaking actions to
alleviate or prevent the creation of 7fear,
just as it can take actions to
5
prevent offense or emotional distress.
Whether any particular state of fear is enough to outweigh First
Amendment values is not the issue at this point. For now it is sufficient
merely to establish that the psychological reality of sensed fear is
harmful enough to individuals that the state has a legitimate, even
important, maybe compelling, interest in taking action to prevent persons
from causing fear in others.
B.

The Internet is Special
In Planned Parenthood, neither the majority nor the dissenters

72. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
73. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 934 (1982).
74. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005).
75. That fear can have positive effects, such as sending a signal to avoid risks, does
not detract from its negative effects. Just as pain can signal the need to avoid the pain
inducing object, or the need to seek treatment for the cause of the pain, we are still well
advised to consider pain a negative value.
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placed any particular emphasis on the fact that the Nuremberg Files
appeared on the Internet. Neither, for that matter, has the Supreme Court
paid any particular attention to the uniqueness of the Internet, even in the
cases before it involving the Internet.76 There is a substantial literature
on the First Amendment and the Internet, but it largely involves the issue
of pornography, which has been the major focus of attempted
government restrictions on the use of the Internet.7 7
The tendency of common law courts is to reason by analogy. In
cases involving the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has tended to
evaluate new forms of media by comparison to old forms, either in terms
of how they are the same or how they are different. Thus, broadcast
media was viewed as different from print media. When cable television
arrived, the court struggled with whether it was like print or broadcast
media, even though it was neither. 78 Now, with the arrival of the
Internet, the Court's tendency may well be the same, trying to fit the
Internet into one or another mold.
There are, however, unique aspects of the Internet. First, it is
permanent. That is, a website remains available indefinitely. While this
is true of books, and perhaps some other print media, most speech is of
limited duration. Live speeches (such as the speech in Brandenburg),
broadcast words or pictures, and even much print media (such as
newspapers, magazines, and handbills) exist only for "the moment."
Only if they are recorded or retained in some other format do these
media result in long-term availability.
Indeed, the Internet is
increasingly becoming the indefinite repository of such media, as well as
other information, because it is cheaper and more accessible than other
alternatives.
Second, the Internet is universally available. Unlike print mediaavailable generally only where published-and broadcast informationavailable only within the range of the broadcast medium-information
on the Internet is available virtually world-wide. Moreover, a website on
the Internet is available "24/7." Thus, unlike virtually any other medium,
a website is available to everyone, whenever they desire it.
76. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764
(2005) (copyright protection analysis unaffected by uniqueness of Internet file sharing
capability); Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (traditional
First Amendment obscenity and pornography analysis applied to Internet
communications).
77. A perusal of law review articles with the words "Internet" and "First
Amendment" in the titles reflect that the substantial majority of those articles dealing
with American restrictions on speech involve restrictions on access to pornography.
78. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994)
(cable distinguished from broadcast media, so that standards developed with respect to
print media applied).
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Third, information on the Internet is virtually cost-free, both for the
producer and consumer. Again, unlike almost any other medium, a
person may publish information on the Internet for free. Many services,
such as Yahoo and MSN, allow people to establish free websites. Many,
if not most, Internet service providers also provide their customers free
websites within the price of their Internet service. In addition, access to
information posted on the Internet is also virtually cost-free. Anyone
who has an Internet connection can view and copy the information on the
Internet. While the cost-free Internet is like the cost-free information
broadcast on the airwaves, these broadcasts are not constantly available,
nor are they permanent.
Fourth, there is no screening function performed by anyone before
information may be posted on the Internet and viewed by others. Again,
unlike virtually all other media, other than the streetcomer speaker or the
handbill, no one will assess whether the publication of information on the
Internet is worthy of publication. This screening function, performed by
editors of print media and broadcasters of broadcast media, provides a
check on what is available. It is not a coincidence that the Internet has
become the preferred medium for information not readily accessible
elsewhere, such as pornography, conspiracy theories, and advertising for
illegal substances.
Fifth, information on the Internet can be posted anonymously and is
normally accessed anonymously and in private. While some media can
be made available anonymously, much cannot be. Similarly, while much
media can be accessed anonymously and in private, some cannot be. The
steetcomer speaker identifies himself, and his listeners likewise are
publicly seen.
The above characteristics of the Internet suggest that the Internet is
indeed special; some of its characteristics may be shared by some other
forms of media in some circumstances, but no medium shares all of the
same characteristics. If this is so, one should be careful in attempting to
analogize speech on the Internet with speech in other forms of media.
For example, as in Brandenburg,the likelihood of one particular speech
resulting in violence is low because of the limited number of listeners
and the isolated nature of the speech in time and place. Therefore,
erecting an effective presumption against the likelihood of violence is not
at odds with reality. The same speech posted on the Internet, however,
may not share the same low probability of provoking violence, precisely
because of its differences from a public speech. Therefore, the implicit
balancing conducted in Brandenburg may not accurately reflect reality
when the same speech is posted on the Internet.
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C. BalancingSpeech and Other Values
Implicit in the different categories of unprotected speech is a
balancing of the value of protecting the speech in question against the
harm the speech engenders. The Brandenburg doctrine implicitly
concludes that when the harm caused by the speech is both intended and
imminently about to occur, the value of the speech is outweighed by its
probability of harm. Defamation cases similarly involve a calculus
involving intent (malice), harm (defamation), and the relative importance
of the speech value (public figure, private figure/public issue, or private
figure/private issue). 79 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell80 weighed the value
of speech on public issues against the harm to public figures caused by
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, the "true threat"
doctrine weighs the value of speech that intentionally threatens physical
harm to a person against the harm caused by the fear engendered in the
person receiving the threat.
First Amendment doctrine, however, generally avoids applying the
implicit balancing to new cases. Rather, courts attempt to place new
cases into one of the existing categories of unprotected speech. If the
speech in a particular case does not fit within one of those categories,
then it is deemed protected speech. This was the methodology employed
by both the majority and dissenting judges in PlannedParenthood.
D. Applying These Insights to PlannedParenthood
Each of the above identified categories of unprotected speech share
the characteristic that when a public issue is involved, as was the case in
the Nuremberg Files website, evidence of a "bad" intent is necessary in
order to restrict the speech; that is, the speaker must intend to cause
harm. In Planned Parenthood, it was well established, and accepted by
the dissent, that the speakers intended to frighten the abortion providers
and to intimidate them into ceasing to provide abortion services. To
instill fear of physical harm into others, and to attempt through that fear
to make people give up their livelihood and discontinue the provision of
constitutionally protected services, is a bad intent.
Even with the requisite bad intent, however, each of the above
identified categories of unprotected speech still involves a weighing of
the relative harm against the relative value of the speech. When the
speech involves a public issue, the speech is appropriately accorded a
79. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985).
80. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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high value; however, the protection of the speech is not absolute. For
example, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court allowed actual
damages upon a showing of malice. 81 Thus, the actual harm outweighed
the value of the false speech made with malice. Nor is it only false
speech that can lose protection when the speech involves public issues
and public figures. For example, in United States v. Kelner,82 a person
was convicted for making a radio speech that included a threat to
assassinate Yasser Arafat.
In Planned Parenthood, however, while the Nuremberg Files
included information and opinion involving public issues, the targeted
abortion providers were not public figures. When speech is intended to
be harmful and does not involve public figures, less protection is
provided to the speech. For example, in Gertz, defamation of a nonpublic figure with malice was held to justify punitive damages.83 Thus,
where the speaker had the requisite intent, not only would actual harm
outweigh the value of the false speech, but false speech could be
constitutionally deterred by punitive damages. Again, it is not just
defamation that enjoys lessened protection when it involves non-public
figures. While Hustler Magazine did not explicitly conclude that the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress could proceed if a nonpublic figure was involved, the opinion is clear that the protection
afforded Hustler derived from the combination of a public issue and a
public figure.
Turning to the harm function, there was no dissent to the conclusion
that the plaintiffs were indeed terrorized by their inclusion on the
Nuremberg Files website, and that their fear was reasonably based. Fear
of physical harm is itself a real harm. The Supreme Court has
recognized that "protecting individuals from the fear of violence [and]
from the disruption that fear engenders" justifies exempting speech from
First Amendment protection.84 Indeed, the real harm that justifies the
loss of protection for speech in the true threat situation is often the
intentional infliction of fear in the listener, rather than any likelihood that
the threat will come to pass. 85 This is the essential difference between
81. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284.
82. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
83. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
84. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
85. Fear may not be the only harm that justifies the loss of speech protection for
certain true threats. For example, threats against the President have been found
unprotected even when the President probably did not have any knowledge of them. See,
e.g., Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969). In these circumstances, the
harm caused by the speech is more diffuse, which is perhaps why, in such a situation, the
Supreme Court set a particularly high standard for such threats. See Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).

2006]

INTIMIDATION AND THE INTERNET

true threats and incitement. The probability of a threat being carried out
need not be high; it is no excuse for making a threat that the speaker did
not intend to carry it out. The threatened physical harm must merely
appear to be likely to occur, because it is the appearance of the
likelihood of the harm that causes the fear, which is the actual evil to be
avoided. With incitement, however, the violence must actually be likely
to occur imminently because it is the violence itself that is the evil to be
avoided.
If one acknowledges that fear itself is the harm that weighs against
the value of speech, it is clear that fear can be as great when the threat is
that others will cause harm as when the harm would come from the
speaker himself. PlannedParenthoodis such a case. The fear felt by the
plaintiffs in response to the Nuremberg Files website was at least as
reasonable and as great as it would have been had the defendants
themselves threatened to kill or injure the plaintiffs. Indeed, by targeting
the plaintiffs with their names, addresses, and other identifying details,
the defendants provided valuable assistance to others more inclined to
commit violent acts.86 That these others were unknown and able to
utilize this information without detection made this assistance all the
more dangerous. In at least one other case, the mere publication of
information that was intended to assist others, unknown to the speaker, in
the commission of violent crimes was itself held to be unprotected
speech.87 While that case is clearly distinguishable from Planned
Parenthood,the court's conclusion there is consistent with the analysis
here that the protection of speech should depend upon the weighing of
the harm the speech creates against the value of the speech, not the
classification of speech into narrow categories that have already been
established reflecting such weighing.
If a true threat is not protected speech because the harm it createsreal and reasonable fear of physical violence-outweighs its value, the
Nuremberg Files website likewise should not be protected speech. The
harm the Nuremberg Files site creates is at least as great as the harm of a
true threat. Furthermore, the intent to cause harm by inducing fear in
specific individuals by publicizing their personally identifying
information and facilitating others to seek them out and harm them, is of
86. Judge Berzon, in her dissent, explicitly stated that she was not addressing "the
constitutional viability of a cause of action for putting another in harm's way by
publicizing information that makes it easier for known or suspected potential assailants to
find an intended victim." Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1103 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
87. See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (publication
of the book Hit Man, giving instructions on how to murder someone and not be caught,
held not protected by the First Amendment).
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the same nature as an intent to induce fear by personally threatening the
individuals. Again, the likelihood and imminence of any actual violence
to the listed abortion providers is not relevant to this weighing, other than
to the extent that it relates to the reasonableness and reality of the fear
induced, which here was conceded by all, because the harm to be
avoided by restricting this speech is not the avoidance of the physical
violence itself, but the avoidance of the fear the speech creates.
Nothing in Claiborne Hardware is inconsistent with this analysis.
First, the Court did not analyze Charles Evers' speeches using a true
threat analysis. Its one quotation from Watts was in a footnote following
the statement: "When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they
must be regarded as protected speech. To rule otherwise would ignore
the 'profound national commitment' that 'debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'' 88 Its purpose was merely to
provide another example of "extemporaneous rhetoric ' 89 that, in context,
could not be understood to mean all that it said. Second, Claiborne
Hardware was not a case brought by persons who became fearful for
their physical safety after Evers' speeches. Indeed, there was no
evidence that anyone was intimidated or made fearful by Evers'
speeches. Instead, Claiborne Hardware was a case seeking damages
brought by persons whose businesses were boycotted. If the boycott
were not protected by the First Amendment, they could collect damages.
Thus, the issue was whether isolated statements made in the course of
two speeches during a six-year boycott could render unprotected the
whole boycott, which was otherwise constitutionally protected. 90 The
Court's conclusion was that, in context, those statements did not have
that effect.
The difference between Claiborne Hardware and Planned
Parenthood is apparent. In Claiborne Hardware, Evers' potentially
threatening statements were ephemeral, extemporaneous, and not central
to the message being communicated. The Nuremberg Files' fearinducing targeting of identified individuals, however, was continuous,
deliberate, and central to the purpose of the website. In Claiborne
Hardware, there was no evidence that Evers' statements caused
apprehension or fear in any of the listeners. The Nuremberg Files,
however, clearly and concededly did cause substantial fear in the
plaintiffs who were identified on the website.

88. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
89. Id.
90. A separate issue was whether isolated acts of violence could likewise render the
whole boycott unprotected.
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Conclusion

This paper has attempted to provide an alternative analysis to a
particular case involving intimidation through the Internet. Rather than
attempt to shoehorn the facts into or distinguish the case from existing
categories of unprotected speech, the analysis here has used a generic
balancing approach that takes account of the value of the particular
speech without regard to its subject matter (abortion) or viewpoint
(against). While this analysis has relied, to some degree, on the balances
made in defining certain categories of unprotected (or semi-protected)
speech, it has done so on the basis that these categories are implicitly
derived from this generic balancing, rather than to show that the speech
involved in the Nuremberg Files is like or not like the speech in
particular categories. The conclusion of this alternative analysis is that
the speech involved in Planned Parenthood that targeted particular
individuals by identifying them with names, addresses, and other
particular details in order to induce fear in these persons for their
physical safety, under circumstances in which the identified persons
would reasonably become afraid, is not protected speech under the First
Amendment.
If this attempt has been successful, it should suggest two things.
First; that beyond the case of Planned Parenthood First Amendment
analysis should be more willing to balance explicitly the value of the
speech against the harms the speech would cause in circumstances not
clearly falling within considered categories, rather than merely attempt to
discern the fit of particular speech within those categories. Second,
beyond the case of Planned Parenthood, courts should be more willing
to recognize the unique aspects of the Internet and how those aspects
may make Internet speech distinguishable from speech in other media.

